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I. Introduction
It is a startling fact that almost the last
area to be investigated empirically by the
social sciences is the area of the construc-
tive forces in human nature and society
which make for the reduction of intergroup
conflict. Research attention has focused
upon the destructive tendencies in human
conduct-upon antisocial action, hostility,
distorted perceptions, irrational fears, au-
thoritarian personality structure, and a wide
variety of psychopathological disorders.
Concern with positive forces has not reached
the point of stimulating systematic investi-
gation, perhaps because of the antinorma-
tive position of present-day scientists, most
of whom feel inclined to leave such matters
to philosophers and social reformers. Yet an
adequate social science must study the so-
cial norms and ethical principles by which
men live.
Naess has suggested that an analysis of
ethical principles with respect to the psy-
chological processes they implicate and the
social conditions which maximize their ef-
fectiveness may be the most important next
step for social science, from the point of
view both of improving its theoretical ade-
quacy and of contributing to the problem of
social survival. His systematization of the
ethical code of Mahatma Gandhi includes
an explicit statement of testable hypotheses
(7). Most of these hypotheses take the form
of predicting that certain types of social ac-
tion will have the long-run effect of achiev-
ing the humanistic aims of a non-violent po-
litical movement while, at the same time,
reducing the probability of hostile attacks
from rival groups. Similar hypotheses can
be extracted from the writings of John
Dewey, William James, and other philoso-
phers who have emphasized that the means
one employs in a social struggle determine
the ends that will ultimately be achieved.
Additional hypotheses that may warrant re-
formulation and investigation probably can
be extracted from writings on ethics by
other modern philosophers such as B. Croce,
L. T. Hobhouse, G. E. Moore, J. Royce,
B. Russell, and A. E. Taylor.
Our main purpose in this paper is to ex-
amine some of the new and promising areas
of research in the field of social psychology
that are suggested by various ethical prop-
ositions concerning methods of reducing in-
tergroup hostility and enhancing mutual ad-
herence to a shared set of ethical norms.
First, we shall call attention to some of the
key variables that might be investigated
and the types of research method that might
be employed. Then we shall formulate a se-
ries of sample hypotheses that are offered
for their suggestive value, illustrating some
of the basic theoretical issues in contempo-
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rary psychology to which a systematic re-
search program on intergroup conflict could
contribute a great deal of pertinent evi-
dence.
II. Some Key Variables
A major set of problems requiring both
theoretical analysis and rigorous empirical
investigation is that of evaluating the social
and psychological consequences of the posi-
tive ethical means employed by any social
movement, organization, or group to achieve
socially desirable goals in its struggle against
rival groups. A large-scale program of re-
search would be needed to determine un-
der what conditions the various ethical
means (independent variables) have the in-
tended or unintended effects (dependent
variables).
EXAMPLES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
An excellent source of various ethical
procedures that are illustrative of the means
to be investigated is the analysis of the Gan-
dhian ethical system prepared by Naess
(7). Most of the normative propositions
and hyoptheses which specify the forms of
conduct that will achieve the ultimate ethi-
cal goals can be restated in terms of means-
consequence relationships. As examples, we
have selected eight norms, all of which are
here formulated as procedures or policies of
social struggle which are means for attain-
ing the various humanitarian ends. Al-
though loosely defined at present, these
means can be readily translated into opera-
tional terms and investigated as independ-
ent variables in systematic research studies:
1. Refraining from any form of verbal or overt
violence toward members of the rival group
2. Openly admitting to the rival group one’s
plans and intentions, including the considera-
tions that determine the tactics one is employ-
ing in the current struggle as well as one’s
longer-range strategic objectives
3. Re f raining from any action that will have the
effect of humiliating the rival group
4. Maldng visible sacrifices for one’s cause
5. Maintaining a consistent and persistent set of
positive activities which are explicit (though
partial) realizations of the group’s objectives
6. Attempting to initiate direct personal interac-
tion with members of the rival group, oriented
toward engaging in friendly verbal discussions
with them concerning the fundamental issues
involved in the social struggle
7. Adopting a consistent attitude of trust toward
the rival group and taking overt actions which
demonstrate that one is, in fact, willing to
act upon this attitude
8. Attempting to achieve a high degree of
empathy with respect to the motives, affects,
expectations, and attitudes of members of the
rival group
Besides the foregoing list, many addition-
al examples of positive means could be
culled from Gandhi’s ethical code (4), from
Dewey’s Human Nature and Conduct (2),
and from other ethical writings which also
contain propositions concerning the positive
and negative social consequences of using
alternative ethical procedures.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The effectiveness of the positive means
can be assessed in relation to the following
outcomes, which constitute the dependent
variables to be investigated:
1. A reduction in the incidence and intensity of
acts of violence
2. An increase in the willingness of the rival
group to engage in arbitration and to over-
come the obstacles that interfere with peace-
ful settlement of disputes
3. Favorable attitude changes among members
of the rival group toward the group behaving
according to ethical principles
4. Greater motivation on the part of group mem-
bers to continue working toward the attain-
ment of humanitarian and social welfare goals
5. Greater success of the group in achieving its
specific humanitarian objectives
6. Favorable attitude changes among members
of the group in the direction of greater com-
mitment to peaceful settlement of disputes
with all rival groups
7. Favorable attitude changes among spectators
of the struggle (i.e., people who are unaffilf-
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ated with either of the contending groups) in
the direction of being more attracted to the
group using positive ethical means, placing
greater reliance in their public communica-
tions, and thereby becoming more influenced
in the direction of accepting their policies and
objectives
In general, the predictions would be that
the positive means such as those listed here
would, singly or in combination, lead to fa-
vorable outcomes as specified by the seven
dependent variables. But, in addition to
these global predictions, a number of much
more refined hypotheses would need to be
tested in order to determine the intervening
processes which mediate the predicted ef-
fects. In the course of investigating the so-
cial and psychological consequences of any
one of the various means, it will probably
turn out that there are a number of differ-
ent component factors involved that must
be separated and investigated as independ-
ent variables. For example, the policy of
openly admitting one’s intentions and plans
to a rival group might give rise to three
quite separate effects.
1. Revealing material that is ordinarily
kept secret may influence the rivals’ attitude
concerning the moral status of the acting
group (e.g., they may become suspicious
that something more important is being kept
secret, or they may become much more re-
spectful of the sincerity of the group).
2. Revealing tactical plans that will hand-
icap the acting group may influence the
rivals’ attitudes concerning the strength of
the acting group (e.g., admission of one’s
plans may be perceived as signs of weakness
and ineptness in conducting the struggle or
as signs of an exceptionally powerful move-
ment that is capable of being successful
without resorting to secrecy).
3. Predicting in advance the deprivations
that will be inflicted upon the rivals may
have the effect of increasing or decreasing
the magnitude of frustration and the inten-
sity of the aggressive impulses aroused
when the deprivations subsequently mate-
rialized.
Thus investigating positive ethical means
may lead to the discovery of a number of
different mediating processes, some of
which may tie in with broad sectors of the-
ory and research in the human sciences.
Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the
expectation that objective evaluations of the
consequences of the positive ethical means
will include careful investigation of the un-
favorable outcomes as well as the favorable
ones. Obviously, the research would have
to be carried out in such a way as to detect
readily any instance in which the outcome
was the reverse of that specified in the fore-
going list of favorable outcomes. In this
connection it will be necessary to specify a
number of additional dependent variables,
representing other types of adverse out-
comes. For example, a certain type of posi-
tive ethical means may prove to be extreme-
ly frustrating to the members who are com-
mitted to using it and incline some of them
to become defensively apathetic and to dis-
affiliate themselves from the group. In some
cases the intrapersonal conflicts engendered
by prolonged suppression of aggressive im-
pulses might conceivably engender a marked
increase in anxiety or other symptoms of 
emotional tension. In the long run, consist-
ent adherence to certain of the positive
means might result in a marked change in
the composition of the membership, with a
preponderance of masochistic and other de-
viant personalities being attracted to it.
To detect such unfavorable consequences,
the research investigator would need to be
alert to any indications of unintended ef-
fects that arise in the course of carrying out
empirical investigations. Comparisons of in-
stances of favorable outcomes with those of
unfavorable outcomes should provide valu-
able evidence concerning the conditions un-
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der which the use of various positive means
does and does not lead to the intended ef-
fects.
CONDITIONING FACTORS
One major set of conditions determining
favorable versus unfavorable outcomes has
to do with the combination of positive
means that are employed by the group.
For example, admission of one’s own plans
and refraining from violence may be inter-
preted as weakness and perceived as rela-
tively ineffective unless accompanied by
visible sacrifices for one’s own cause and a
program of persistent, clear activity dem-
onstrating the group’s objectives. Moreover,
the use of one means, such as refraining
from violence, may strengthen the commit-
ment to the group goal, and this interven-
ing psychological change may facilitate the
effective execution of other means, such as
making visible sacrifices for one’s cause.
Thus it will be necessary to study the inde-
pendent variables in combination and in in-
teraction as well as singly.
The nature of the group struggle is an-
other conditioning factor in the operation of
these variables. At least three dimensions of
group struggle must be taken into account.
The first dimension is the degree of con-
flict of interest relative to the community of
interest between competing groups. It is
generally assumed that non-violent means
and positive ethical practices are more ap-
plicable to factions within the same institu-
tion, since they have so much in common,
than to rival nations, where the conflict of
interest is high. Nevertheless, it is conceiv-
able that the suicidal character of modem
methods of violent group conflict has made
this distinction less important, since the
common interest in survival has become in-
creasingly clear. In any case, it may be pos-
sible to discover auxiliary means of making
common interests salient to rival nations
and thereby increasing the chances of suc-
cess for limiting international clashes to
non-violent conflicts.
A second dimension concerns the psycho-
logical closeness of the group conflict to the
people involved. The dynamics of enmity
between close personal associates and dis-
tant peoples may be different. The distance
between competing nations makes their
struggle less intense on a personalized basis
than that between rival factions in the same
political party. On the other hand, the more
remote, the fewer the reality checks and
hence the easier it is for autistic perception,
projected fantasies, and hostile distortions
to play their role.
A third related dimension has to do with
the degree of institutionalization of the chan-
nels, or means, of conducting group and na-
tional competition and conflict. Violent
means of resolving personal and group con-
flicts may be a direct reflection of the per-
sonal aggression of the protagonists, as in
frontier community violence, which is an
anticipation of legal institutions. But more
commonly at the group level, practices have
become institutionalized so that there is no
one-to-one corerspondence between the
warlike actions of a nation and the warlike
character of its people (5). Most wars are
probably fought not because the great ma-
jority want to fight but because they accept
the legitimacy of the process which has led
them into war. All these considerations sug-
gest the need for taking into account the
nature of the group struggle in studying the
effectiveness of ethical forms of social ac-
tion. In a final section some aspects of the
institutionalization of aggression will be dis-
cussed.
Closely related to research on limiting
conditions is another field of investigation
comprising the study of psychological and
social conditions which facilitate the will-
ingness of group members to use the posi-
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tive ethical principles referred to as the &dquo;in-
dependent variables.&dquo; In other words, it is
also necessary as part of a systematic pro-
gram of research to consider the use of the
positive means as dependent variables and
to find out the predisposing factors which
enable individuals and groups to limit them-
selves to positive ethical policies in their
struggles with opposing groups.
III. Methods and Techniques
We envisage three phases for the devel-
opment, refinement, and testing of hypoth-
eses about the peaceful resolution of inter-
group conflicts. They need not constitute a
discrete temporal sequence, since there is
much to be gained from an overlap in the
timing of the phases.
The first phase would consist of the use
of existing data at two levels: documentary
evidence and primary-source data. The for-
mer would call for comparative case studies
of historical instances of social and political
struggles in which the given action policies
were and were not employed-e.g., studies
of various radical, pacifist, religious, and
nationalist movements whose social effects
can be appraised from available documen-
tary evidence. Primary-source data could be
drawn from interview and questionnaire
studies bearing on industrial conflict situa-
tions and factional disputes within social
movements, military organizations, political
parties, and schools. Of particular relevance
would be data on the correlates of different
demands and practices on the part of super-
visors, union officials, military officers, po-
litical leaders, and teachers. This stage of
the investigation would furnish some pre-
liminary testing of hypotheses but would
serve mainly for the more precise formula-
tion of significant variables and their inter-
relationships.
The second phase would consist of field
studies of current and developing instances
of social and political struggles in which the
given action policies are and are not being
employed-e.g., collecting systematic inter-
view data in United States southern com-
munities where Negro organizations are at-
tempting to bring about desegregation. The
emphasis here would be upon specifying
the relevant types of data in advance,
whereas in the first phase the studies would
be limited by the data which happen to be
available. Again this stage could contribute
both to the testing and to the reformulation
of hypotheses.
The final or experimental phase would
consist of field and laboratory experiments.
The second phase gives better control over
the collection of relevant data than the first,
but adequate control of the operative varia-
bles requires the use of experimental tech-
niques.
Field experiments, which involve the use
of controlled experimental techniques in
natural settings, have the advantage that
the necessary controls can be taken into ac-
count in advance of the investigation. They
also have the merit of dealing with the full
power of social variables as they occur in a
real community setting. Such experiments
could be devised, for example, in connec-
tion with the program of a social or politi-
cal group in which alternative action poli-
cies are carried out in equivalent towns.
(E.g., the co-operation might be obtained
of a research-minded national organization
which is currently engaging in a social or
political struggle within many different com-
munities throughout the country. Certain
local chapters in one designated set of com-
munities might be asked to use a given ac-
tion policy, whereas other chapters in an
equivalent set of communities might be
asked to use a contrasting action policy.
The effects could be ascertained by inter-
viewing representative samples within the
two sets of communities and by using be-
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havioral indexes such as incidence of overt
violence on the part of rival groups, in-
creases or decreases in membership of the
competing groups, etc.)
Laboratory experiments of the type em-
ployed in current research on group dynam-
ics could investigate some of the variables
of interest in contrived settings, but the
manipulations would be relatively weak.
The advantage of this method would be the
possibility of isolating single variables and
varying their strength fairly precisely, al-
though within limited ranges. The most ef-
ficient use of this method would probably
be to deal with very specific questions
which might arise from field experiments
about the properties of a given variable.
IV. Sample Hypotheses and
Problems
This section will be devoted largely to
presenting a series of hypotheses concern-
ing the psychological processes which me-
diate the anticipated favorable and unfa-
vorable effects of using various violent and
non-violent procedures in intergroup con-
flicts. We shall present ( 1 ) some general
propositions concerning the influence of in-
strumental actions on group goals and the
role of leadership in using means consistent
with the goals; (2) some of the major psy-
chological changes that might account for
the &dquo;corrupting&dquo; effects of using violent
means; (3) a number of additional explan-
atory hypotheses bearing on the converse
process-the &dquo;constructive&dquo; effects of ab-
staining from violence; and (4) hypotheses
concerning the attitude changes produced
by positive ethical means which involve
consistently treating the members of oppos-
ing groups as potential allies.
A final section will consider the problem
of the consequences of the institutionaliza-
tion of violence.
INFLUENCE OF INSTRUMENTAL
ACTIONS ON GROUP GOALS
That individuals and groups can be in-
volved in antisocial practices in the inter-
ests of desirable social goals and still main-
tain these goals in relatively pure fashion is
a doctrine for which there is little psycho-
logical support. Once people act in a cer-
tain manner, they tend to develop beliefs
and attitudes to make that behavior part of
their value system. Thus psychologists have
long talked about mechanisms becoming
drives or instrumental activities becoming
functionally autonomous (1). An important
factor in the doctrine that the end justifies
the means is the separation this imposes in
fact between means and ends. John Dewey
and other writers have emphasized that
an expedient means chosen without re-
gard for the goal sought will not be an
intrinsic part of an integrated pattern of
means-end activity. It becomes increasingly
difficult for the person himself, as well as
those who observe his actions, to identify
the goal which he is seeking from the in-
strumental means he employs. When an in-
dividual devotes his major energies to using
expedient means, he will tend to see the
justification of his behavior not in what he
actually does every day but in the great goal
which lies somewhere beyond. And, of
course, it is relatively easy to justify one’s
morality by goals which are remote and
which permit little reality testing. Concrete
everyday activities, however, do not permit
easy rationalization when they have to be
considered on their own merits. It may be
just as important, therefore, for a group to
tie its ethical standards to means as to ends,
since the means can be checked and ob-
served more readily than the goals.
The central point of what has just been
said is that repeated behavior of an anti-
social character, though originally in the
interests of altruistic social goals, will prob-
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ably lead to the abandonment of those goals
as directing forces for the individual. This
proposition applies to the leaders as well
as the followers within any group or organ-
ization.
Persons in positions of leadership, of
course, play the major role in proposing and
executing the ethical policies that are used
in any social struggle and in inducing the
rest of the membership to adopt them. The
leaders of groups with humanitarian goals
may be able to execute certain of their func-
tions more effectively if they adopt expedi-
ent means on an opportunistic basis. But, in
the long run, opportunistic leaders will
probably be less effective in moving their
followers toward achieving the ultimate ob-
jectives of their organization than leaders
who insist upon using means that are per-
ceived by the members as being consistent
with humanitarian goals. This principle has
been recognized by those political and so-
cial movements which attempt to maintain
a fictitious divorce between their ideology
and their opportunistic methods by assign-
ing different people to the two functions.
Such groups sometimes try to keep their
ethical ideology &dquo;pure&dquo; by not invoking it
for every opportunistic measure.
There are at least four different consid-
erations which make it likely that the long-
run losses will offset the short-run gains
whenever the leader of an altruistic move-
ment indorses expedient means that are not
consistent with the group’s ultimate objec-
tives. (1) If leaders justify bad means for
good ends, it will create perceptual ambi-
guity for their followers. Many followers
are not steeped in the ideology of the move-
ment, and it is difficult for them to distin-
guish in many instances the means from the
end. (2) They will have less confidence in
the sincerity of a leader who is not pre-
pared to sacrifice for the cause. His espous-
ing of expediency may be interpreted by
the members as indicating that he is taking
the easy way and is not sufficiently devoted
himself to take the harder route to his ob-
jectives. (3) To restore confidence, the
leader is likely to resort to aggressive be-
havior toward his opponents, to impute to
them an exaggerated evil intent, and even
to advocate violence toward them. (4)
Even a single opportunistic practice by a
leader sets a precedent and makes subse-
quent opportunism easier for the leader and
his followers to accept. Since the principle
has already been compromised once, fur-
ther compromise will do little additional
harm.
Thus, on the one hand, confidence in the
leader’s sincerity is likely to be undermined
by his use of opportunistic methods, and,
on the other hand, the goals of the group
become obscured for the members when-
ever their leaders succeed in inducing them
to accept expedient means which are obvi-
ously inconsistent with the group’s objec-
tives. When the expedient means involve
the use of violence against opposing groups,
these tendencies will tend to be accentu-
ated. We turn now to some additional hy-
potheses which specify the psychological
changes that occur within any participant
who engages in hostile actions against peo-
ple who are opposing the program or ide-
ology of his group.
11 CORRUPTINE EFFECTS OF USING
VIOLENT MEANS
Why and under what conditions would
the use of violent means be expected to
have extremely adverse effects on the indi-
vidual participants in a social movement or
organization? More specifically, what psy-
chological changes within each participant
might account for the following two conse-
quences of the use of a violent means for
the alleged purpose of attaining socially de-
sirable goals: (a) an increase in the proba-
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bility that such means will be used again in
the future when similar, and perhaps even
less demanding, occasions arise, and ( b ) a
decrease in the probability that the group
will work toward the achievement of social-
ly desirable goals (i.e., violent means &dquo;cor-
rupt&dquo; the ends)?
One obvious answer might be that a vio-
lent means will tend to corrupt the ends be-
cause it promotes counteraggression on the
part of the group’s opponents, and this cre-
ates a need to use more and more violence,
ending up by engaging all the energies of
the group in a violent struggle with the ri-
vals instead of enabling positive actions to
be taken toward the attainment of the long-
run social goals. But even when we set
aside the possibility of evoking counterag-
gression, there are at least three other psy-
, chological processes that may come into
play, any one of which could have the ef-
fect of &dquo;corrupting&dquo; the members of a group
that participates in the use of violent
means:
1. Even when the violent means is so-
cially sanctioned, the users may react with
some degree of guilt (as a consequence of
earlier moral training or as a consequence
of generalization from non-sanctioned forms
of violence). Guilt reactions may take the
form of (a) high anticipation of being pun-
ished by the target group; (b) preoccupation
with the question of whether or not the ac-
tion was correct; and (c) affective disturb-
ances, which may range from completely
conscious feelings of guilt to vague feelings
of uneasiness with no awareness of the source
of the disturbance. One of the typical ways
in which people attempt to reduce or coun-
teract such guilt reactions is to attribute evil
and immoral intentions to the target toward
which their violence had been directed.
Such attributions may enable a guilt-ridden
person to justify the violent action to him-
self and to others; it may also involve a pro-
jection mechanism which operates as an un-
conscious technique for warding off guilt
(3). The perception of the target as being
extremely threatening and evil would have
the double effect of (a) increasing the
tendency to attack violently again in an ef-
fort to weaken the target, ( b ) decreasing
one’s willingness to work out compromises
with the target group, and (c) altering the
conception of humanitarian objectives in
such a way as to exclude members of the
target group.
2. Participating in any violent action may
have the effect of weakening the internal
superego controls which are the product of
normal socialization. Superego controls are
often based on exaggerated conceptions and
partially unconscious fantasies about the
possible consequences of performing the
forbidden act. In psychotherapy a charac-
teristic sequence of changes occurs when
patients overcome anxiety or guilt reactions
in the sexual sphere or in connection with
socially aggressive behavior. After they have
once &dquo;tested out&dquo; the new (non-inhibited)
mode of action, they are left with less ex-
aggerated conceptions and fantasies about
the consequences of such behavior. Thus the
inhibition tends to be gradually extin-
guished. The same sort of process seems to
go on among combat soldiers whose inhibi-
tions about killing the enemy begin to lessen
after the first time they are induced to per-
form the disturbing act of shooting at en-
emy soldiers. A similar learning process may
go on in connection with each instance of
group-sanctioned violent action such that
the person’s automatic superego controls
are lessened and he becomes capable of
indulging in more and more extreme forms
of violence.
3. Social contagion effects may occur
within a group or organization such that
when a highly respected leader or member
of the group uses a violent means under
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highly &dquo;justified&dquo; circumstances, other mem-
bers of the group become less inhibited
about engaging in similar acts of violence.
This contagion may be partly the product
of learning that the violent means is not
disapproved, if it is used without criticism
by the standard-bearers of morality within
the group. Unconscious processes of iden-
tification may also facilitate the contagion
effect. While, in the first instances, violence
is applied by group leaders only after care-
ful judgment, in subsequent instances the
followers will be much more ready to in-
dulge in violence without such a careful
appraisal of whether or not it is justified.
Thus the attitude may gradually develop
that violent means are acceptable and even
desirable, provided only that they are used
in the service of the group’s cause.
CONSTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF ABSTAINING
FROM VIOLENCE
The next question is the converse of the
one just discussed: Why and under what
conditions would abstaining from the use of
sanctioned violent action be expected to
have positive effects-e.g., decreasing the
probability that violent means will be used
in the future, increasing the probability that
the group will work toward achieving its
original humanitarian goals, and increasing
members’ adherence to the positive social
objectives and moral standards which the
group sponsors?
Some of the answers to this question may
involve the same psychological mechanisms
and social contagion effects specified in the
preceding section. However, there may also
be some processes that are of a different
character, and for this reason we feel that
the question of the constructive effects of
non-violent action should be considered
separately from the question of the &dquo;cor-
rupting&dquo; effects of violent action. In the
discussion which follows, we shall indicate
additional mechanisms that may come into
play when members of a group adhere to a
group decision to abstain from using vio-
lent means under conditions where such
means are considered to be an acceptable
or expected form of behavior.
In many persons, participation in sanc-
tioned violence may serve as a means of re-
ducing conscious and unconscious fears of
being passively manipulated by others or of
being exposed to damaging attacks and
deprivations at the hands of one’s rivals. To
the extent that such fears are based on mis-
conceptions or exaggerated fantasies about
the magnitude of the danger, a given act of
abstaining from sanctioned violence may in-
volve a process of emotional relearning
(similar to that referred to in the preceding
section in connection with the lowering of
superego control). In this instance, how-
ever, the process would be equivalent to
that which goes on when a hyperaggressive
patient undergoes psychotherapy. Sooner or
later he tries out a passive, non-aggressive
way of responding to the therapist and dis-
covers that the dangers of passivity which
he had so greatly feared do not actually ma-
terialize. Similarly, when the members of a
group adhere to a group decision to behave
in a conciliatory rather than a hostile way,
their anticipations about the dangerous con-
sequences of non-violence may be brought
more into line with reality. If their fear of
being passive is thereby reduced to some
extent, they will no longer be so strongly
motivated to engage in violence on future
occasions when confronted with a choice
between violent and non-violent means of
struggle against their opponents.
Guilt mechanisms may also play an im-
portant role in the internalization of non-
violent norms. Insofar as any act of violence
(whether sanctioned or not) generates some
degree of guilt, at least a slight degree of
emotional tension would be experienced by
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the average group member whenever he
anticipates engaging in a future act of vio-
lence. A reduction in emotional tension
might occur if, at the time when the group
member is experiencing anticipatory guilt,
a communication from a group leader or an
expression of group consensus conveys the
idea that the group’s goals can be better
achieved by abstaining from violence and
by using an effective form of non-violent
action instead. The decision to accept the
recommendation would be reinforced by the
reduction of anticipatory guilt. The reward
value of the decision might be enhanced if
the ideology of the group included the norm
that violence is a morally inferior form of
action which should be avoided as much
as possible. Even if only lip service is given
to this norm, the group member may experi-
ence a heightening of self-esteem in addi-
tion to guilt reduction if he anticipates that
others in his group will approve of his de-
cision to abstain from violence. If each act
of abstention is rewarded in this way, a new
attitude will gradually tend to develop such
that the person becomes increasingly more
predisposed to decide or vote in favor of
non-violent means. Perhaps under these con-
ditions, good moral &dquo;practice makes per-
fect.&dquo;
ATTITUDE CHANGES PRODUCED BY
TREATING OPPONENTS AS POTENTIAL
ALLIES
Many of the positive ethical means to
which we have referred involve more than
merely abstaining from violence. Among the
examples which we have cited are such
means as displaying an attitude of trust
toward the members of opposing groups,
maintaining friendly personal interactions
with them, and seeking to understand their
motives and attitudes by deliberately em-
pathizing with them. Although somewhat
different rationales for the various positive
means have been put forth by their pro-
ponents, all of them seem to point in the
general direction of replacing a hostile, com-
petitive, antagonistic approach by a policy
of treating opponents as potential friends
or allies. The hypotheses which follow per-
tain to the use of any positive ethical means
or combination of such means, provided
that they are employed on the basis of ad-
hering to this general policy.
Just as in the case of using violent means,
social contagion effects may occur when
positive ethical means are used. But the
factors which facilitate the contagion may
be somewhat different. Because hostility
and violent aggressive action is a very ele-
mentary impulsive form of reaction to peo-
ple who interfere with the attainment of
important group objectives, many persons
may remain unaware of alternative ways of
dealing with opponents and of overcoming
the frustrations engendered by their opposi-
tion. Thus, whenever violent group action
is regarded as the socially accepted mode
of response to this type of frustration, many
members of the group may gain sudden
enlightenment if a respected leader or sub-
group calls attention to the possibility of
using an alternative approach. If the group
decides to try out the proposed alternatives,
even if its success remains ambiguous, those
members of the group who have a relatively
low need for aggression may also learn that
the new means is less energy-consuming
and less disagreeable than the traditional
means. In this way, a process of accultura-
tion may take place whereby a social tech-
nique evolved through the intelligence and
ingenuity of others comes to be adopted by
people who had formerly accepted, more or
less unthinkingly, a general policy of deal-
ing with opponents in a hostile manner.
Other psychological changes may also
mediate the effects of adopting, on a tenta-
tive basis, the use of positive ethical means.
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Whenever a member of a group accepts a
group decision to use an unconventional
friendly approach to rivals, he is likely to
feel it necessary to justify the fact that he
is deviating from the expected course of
action (e.g., &dquo;Why am I willing to allow
these people to provoke us so much without
our hating and punishing them?&dquo;). The need
for such justification may sometimes arise
from exposure to cross-pressures resulting
from conflicting (pro-hostility) norms held
by other groups with which one is affiliated.
Or the need for justifying may come from
internalized standards-e.g., awareness that
one is deviating from the ego ideal asso-
ciated with sex role (&dquo;Am I a sissy?&dquo;). In
any case, the need to justify the policy of
treating opponents as potential allies would
motivate the person (a) to take account of
the positive attitudes and human qualities
of the rivals; (b) to minimize the hostile
intentions of the rivals; and (c) to predict
that the friendly positive approach will be
more successful than an antagonistic ap-
proach would be. Thus the effort to justify
an act of friendly treatment may lead to
cognitive restructurings and a shift in mo-
tivational pressures, which could contribute
to two types of attitude change: ( 1 ) re-
duced hostility toward the rival group and
(2) more favorable evaluations of the de-
sirability of using positive means in general.
Nor are the beneficial effects of non-vio-
lence confined to the members of the group
pursuing this policy. As group members
take into consideration the positive attitudes
of members of the out-group and stop re-
acting toward them as if they were deadly
enemies, the out-group itself is under less
pressure to be defensively aggressive. Thus
the opponents may be influenced to engage
in fewer acts of provocative hostility, and,
in the long-run, some of their leaders and
part of the membership may even become
motivated to live up to the other group’s
view of them as potential allies.
SOME FURTHER CONSEQUENCES AND
CAUSES OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
AGGRESSION
In the preceding discussion we have con-
sidered in some detail the psychological
mechanisms which may account for the
corrupting effects of violence and the con-
structive effects of abstaining from violence.
In this section attention will be given to
further consequences of the operation of
these basic mechanisms and to supplemen-
tary social-psychological processes which
make institutionalized aggression the per-
sistent problem of organized society.
Though our major concern is with socially
sanctioned aggression, it is important for
theoretical reasons to differentiate between
personal hostility and institutionalized forms
of aggression with respect to both causes
and effects. The recipient and the initiator
of social aggression may be affected dif-
ferentially if the violence is a sanctioned
institutional practice or if it is the release
of personal aggression. The two violent ac-
tions may be alike in physical character,
but they are not necessarily perceived, ex-
perienced, or reacted to as the same. Per-
sonal aggression may be felt by the recipient
as more of an attack upon his ego than the
institutional action; it may lead to person-
alized resentment, more immediate resort
to counteraggression, and perhaps less long-
term effect. Institutionalization may leave
the individual no easily identifiable target
of a personal nature for counteraggression;
it may confront the individual with sufficient
force that he has no way of striking back.
It may lead to displaced aggression against
a convenient scapegoat, to intropunitiveness,
to apathetic acceptance, or to repressed
hostility. These consequences can occur in
response to personal acts of aggression, but
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they are less likely to occur where the per-
sonal target is easily identifiable and where
countermeasures are within the grasp of the
individual.
Our major problem today is not protec-
tion against the hostile elements among us
as individuals capable of violence. Our
major problem is with institutionalized
forms of violence, as in conflicts between
organized groups and nations. Such institu-
tionalized aggression is accentuated by the
presence of hostile people in certain situa-
tions, but the correlation between the
amount and intensity of group conflict and
the amount of latent hostility would not be
high save under very special conditions.
There are situations, however, in which
the interaction of the two-personal hos-
tility and institutional aggression-is of far-
reaching significance, as in the opportuni-
ties which institutional channels may offer
for the expression of latent hostility.
There are three psychological dangers
in the institutionalization of violence which
are worthy of special investigation: (1) the
release of latent hostilities under conditions
of social sanction of violence, (2) the apa-
thetic condoning of any institutionally ap-
proved practice, and (3) the perpetuation
and intensification of institutional violence.
1. The release of latent hostilities under
conditions of the sanctioning of violence.-
In Western society the antisocial nature of
acts of aggression is communicated to chil-
dren very early in the socialization process.
Aggressive acts toward others are repeated-
ly censured and punished. If there is lack
of understanding by parent and child in
this process and continued frustration of
the child, there may be repression, but re-
tention, of the hostility. As a result, the
adult will be burdened with strong latent
hostility which comes into continual con-
flict with his superego standards. These
standards are reinforced by perception of
the social norms of the group which pro-
scribes personal acts of violence. The pres-
ence of others and the presence of au-
thority represent the stimulus situation
which inhibits the aggressions of the in-
dividual. But, then, a curious reversal oc-
curs. In certain contexts acts of violence
are legitimized and sanctioned by groups
and institutions. In times of war almost all
sources of authority within each nation as-
sert that it is noble and proper to kill for
one’s country. The social support for the
antisocial action generally has three ele-
ments : the justification of a moral purpose,
the justification of legitimacy, and the
justification that others approve. Since the
traditional inhibitor of violence has been
the social environment, violence can as-
sume intense and bizarre forms when the
inhibitor is transformed into the facilita-
tor. This is the classic theory of crowd
behavior (6). But whereas in the crowd
the social support is limited and tempo-
rary, in organized groups the support is
more extensive and continuing. Thus with-
in the areas where aggression is socially
sanctioned, individuals can resolve their
conflicts by indulging their worst impulses
and by attaining social recognition and re-
ward for so doing.
One danger in the social sanctioning of
violence is that the release of hostility will
go far beyond the bounds of what is sanc-
tioned. Supposedly appropriate force is in-
voked on an objective and impersonal basis
to accomplish the group’s purpose. In prac-
tice, however, the way is open for abuses
of various sorts. To the extent that latent
hostility does exist in the members of the
group and their leaders, there will be a
tendency to push beyond the necessary
force to accomplish the group goal because
leaders directly and followers vicariously
enjoy the opportunity to release repressed
impulses. An extreme illustration would be
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the use of terror by the German Nazis to
maintain power for the Nazi party, which
was then pushed to the point of attempts
to exterminate entire groups and alleged
races. The classic argument against the
use of corporal punishment in the schools
is the possibility of sadism when the pun-
isher can use aggression disguised as so-
cially approved and necessary discipline.
In a preceding section it was indicated
that the use of violence leads to further
violence through weakening the internal
superego controls. The inhibition against
the expression of aggression becomes ex-
tinguished. This is especially true in the
area of institutional aggression, where so-
cial support makes it easy to violate the
basic social prohibitions. Such social sup-
port makes it possible to rationalize away
guilt feelings and makes similar violence
easier in the future.
We are really dealing in these examples
with an interaction of institutional and per-
sonal aggression. Our contention is that
people may perceive and react differently
to personal, as against institutional, vio-
lence. The former is more identifiable and
leads to more personalized resentment, since
it is felt to be a direct attack upon the
self. The latter induces in its victims more
displacement and more generalized hostility.
Frequently, however, in the case of sanc-
tioned violence which permits the expres-
sion of latent hostility we have a pattern
combining both types of aggression. The
chances are that this combination will be
perceived by its victims as the most unjust
of all aggression. There is a tendency to
personalize actions which are in any way
injurious to the self. In this instance, how-
ever, the amicted individual is right, since
there is personal animus in his punisher.
But, unlike purely personal aggression, there
is no recourse to any form of counterag-
gression, since the punishment is legal and
proper. Moreover, the victim has limited
opportunity for even verbally blowing off
steam against his opponent. The result is
often intense generalized hatred. Where
the situation becomes completely intolera-
ble, it may result in identification with
the aggressor.
This combination of institutional violence
and personal aggression is one reason why
group conflicts become intensified over time
and become difficult of solution, even when
there is a good objective basis for solution.
The scars left by a strike in which both com-
pany and union have used force are of this
character. The company guards given free
rein to their destructive impulses may have
abused their power in a manner which the
strikers never forget. And the strong-arm
squad of the union may have acted similarly
toward strike breakers. Both sides feel that
the other side has taken advantage of a
group struggle to perpetuate a personal out-
rage. Some of the bitterest memories of
World War II are not of massive destruc-
tion by heavy artillery and bombers but the
use of the cloak of military necessity for
the expression of personal sadism.
2. The apathetic condoning of institu-
tional practices.-Another danger lies in the
passive acceptance of any violence perpe-
trated by one’s own group or even by a rival
group if it has some legal sanction. This is a
different response from vicarious indulgence
in one’s own impulses toward violence and
has not received adequate attention. Since
the act of force is institutionally sanctioned,
it is perceived by many as an objective
event. There is no sense of personal out-
rage, even if the action is directed at deviant
group members. This passive acceptance of
violence sanctioned by the group, which
would otherwise be regarded as basically
wrong, is often the result of a compart-
mentalization in thinking and attitude. It is
related to psychological factors mentioned
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in our previous discussion of the means-
end problem, which also involves a com-
partmentalization such that the individual
is not compelled to face up to consequences
of his behavior. When this compartmentali-
zation is carried to an extreme, it means
that there is one morality for the individual
and a completely different morality for the
group. Since the group standard can be
justified by very remote goals, any action
which the group leaders suggest must be
accepted. When the German people pas-
sively accepted the violence perpetrated in
Nazi concentration camps, it was probably
not because of their higher level of latent
hostility or sadism but because of their
compartmentalization of morality. What was
legal and sanctioned by the authorities was
right, whether or not it was consistent with
their own personal standards of morality.
In general, people as group members will
condone actions by group representatives
which they will not approve of for them-
selves as individuals. In time the punish-
ments used against individual members by
the group will tend to be brought into
line with the punishments approved of by
members in their personal lives. Brutal
forms of physical punishment tend to be
dropped from public institutions after they
are no longer approved of in interpersonal
relations. But in the area of group actions
in relation to other groups we permit types
of behavior that we do not countenance
among individuals. Though such a dual set
of standards can be defended, the danger
is that the justification comes to rest not
on practice and its consequences but on a
social myth which asserts the unquestioned
prerogative of the institution qua institution.
The corrupting effect of such condoning of
institutional aggression can be seen in war
and postwar periods when encroachments
are made on individual and civil liberties.
Self-seeking politicians under some cloak of
governmental authority can carry such
threats to an extreme and still secure the
acquiescence of many people, since such in-
stitutional attacks against our enemies, ex-
ternal and internal, are assumed to be their
legitimate function.
3. The perpetuation and intensification
of institutional violence.-Personal aggres-
sion, lacking institutional supports, is spo-
radic and variable. When violence becomes
an accepted part of the practice of an or-
ganization, it not only is perpetuated but
tends to grow much like other parts of the
organization. This perpetuation and inten-
sification of institutional aggression comes
about in three ways: ( a ) the setting-up of
specialized roles, ( b ) role adaptation, or
the effects of taking roles upon personalities,
and (c) role selection, or the tendency to-
ward a fit between unusual roles and per-
sonality types.
a) By creating special roles, organiza-
tional structures do not rely upon chance
factors for the performance of various func-
tions but make such performance the sys-
tematic work of trained experts. In addition
to the motivation intrinsic to the role, the
institution enlists a variety of organization
motivations such as monetary rewards, pro-
motion or upgrading, group acceptance,
etc. Moreover, in any sector of an organi-
zation people occupying given roles tend
to make their role functions as important
as possible, partly because of self-interest
in their careers, partly for the encourage-
ment of morale, and partly because of the
psychological prominence of their own tasks
compared to others they know less about.
The armed forces or the FBI is like any
other part of a bureaucratic structure in
seeking bigger appropriations and more
personnel.
b ) In the earlier discussion of the effects
of instrumental actions upon group goals it
was pointed out that such actions affect the
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value system of the individual. Role be-
’ havior, like any other form of behavior,
leads to its rationalization. Personal values
are brought into line with the individual’s
action. What he does, he may do as his job,
but after a time he sees this as necessary,
important, and desirable. Even in those
cases where the role is not originally con-
genial to the personality pattern of its oc-
cupant, remaining in the role results in
modification of the personality. To be a
member of a combat force and to hold
pacifist values produces intense internal con-
flict. If the individual cannot readily escape
from the behavioral demands of a role, he
will tend to accept the rationalization pro-
vided by the organization in order to dull
the sharp edges of the conflict. In time, this
acceptance undermines old values and
builds up a new value system. Thus role
adaptation means not only carrying out the
required behavior but justifying it as a de-
sirable course of action. Every occupational
and professional group develops an ideol-
ogy which is supportive of its practices to
the extent of occasional idealization of its
functions. In the same fashion the military,
police, and custodial vocations develop
values consonant with their behavior.
c) There is a tendency toward a fit be-
tween unusual institutional roles and basic
personality patterns. The general notion of
the fit between bureaucratic roles and per-
sonality has probably been overdone, but
there is a good deal of truth in the thesis
when we are dealing with unusual roles
which call for atypical patterns of motiva-
tion and behavior. The censor of porno-
graphic literature may sometimes be sus-
pected of enjoying his duty. When an in-
stitution permits violence as part of its func-
tion, people will be attracted to this role
who derive satisfactions from the nature of
the work. Thus there is a self-selection
process for brutal roles. In the police forces
of some American cities, among prison
guards, and in the strong-arm squads of
some labor unions there will be individuals
who gravitate to and remain in these roles
(when there are equally well-paid positions
open to them elsewhere) who are of a
special personality type. Before the profes-
sionalization of American police forces there
were many cities in which it was not al-
ways easy to distinguish between the mem-
ber of the third-degree squad and the
criminal he was bringing to justice.
Institutional support for roles of violence
can be a corrupting factor within an or-
ganization far more than is generally real-
ized. Even though not all roles of violence
are filled by persons with strong needs to
discharge sadistic or hostile impulses, such
personalities can readily dominate their part
of the organization. Less congenial person-
alities for these roles will tend to drop out
over time. The more brutal individuals
will remain and, through their continuity in
the organization and their greater motiva-
tion, will set the pattern of accepted prac-
tice. Moreover, their mutual reinforcement
of one another may intensify brutal prac-
tices and perpetuate them. The history of
some concentration camps illustrates this
trend. Brutal practices in prisons and among
police forces have been difficult to uproot
because it would mean the wholesale dis-
missal of large groups of people-those
guilty of flagrant violations and those who
are virtual accomplices in such violations.
V. Summary
The purpose of this paper was to show
the applicability of the research methods of
behavioral science to problems of group
conflict and interpersonal hostility. The par-
ticular frame of reference employed is that
of social psychology. Applications from the
concepts and techniques of this field are
made to certain aspects of the use of vio-
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lence and of constructive methods in achiev-
ing group goals. A section on methods,
moreover, outlines both a general strategy
for research investigation and the more spe-
cific techniques called for at the tactical
level. Some of the normative propositions
from Arne Naess’s analysis of the Gandhian
ethical system are examined as the basis for
empirical studies. Particular attention is
given to the effects of the use of violence
and of abstaining from violence in terms of
the psychological processes involved. The
concluding part of the paper discusses fac-
tors making for the perpetuation and in-
tensification of institutionalized aggression.
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